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Translation

Vol. 2 No. 1 (2015): Brazilian Journal of Empirical Legal Studies

Empirical scholarship in contract law: possibilities and pitfalls

  • Russell Korobkin
DOI
https://doi.org/10.19092/reed.v2i1.49
Submitted
January 30, 2015
Published
2015-01-31

Abstract

Professor Korobkin examines and analyzes empirical contract law scholarship over the last fifteen years in an attempt to guide scholars concerning how empiricism can be used in and enhance the study of contract law. After defining the parameters of the study, Professor Korobkin categorizes empirical contract law scholarship by both the source of data and main purpose of the investigation. He then describes and analyzes three types of criticisms that can be made of empirical scholarship, explains how these criticisms pertain to contract law scholarship, and considers what steps researchers can take to minimize the force of such criticisms.

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