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Articles

Vol. 4 No. 2 (2017): Brazilian Journal of Empirical Legal Studies

Forgotten disputes: empirical analysis of concentrate judicial review cases waiting for judgement

DOI
https://doi.org/10.19092/reed.v4i2.146
Submitted
September 14, 2016
Published
2017-05-17

Abstract

What are the constitutional issues forgotten by the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) for the non-inclusion of
cases to be heard on trial agenda? Can Justices’ characteristics influence the inclusion of the direct actions of unconstitutionality (ADIs) on trial agenda? The Court has demonstrated, over the past twenty years, a cooperative trend with the interests of the executive branch, when triggered by constitutional control mechanisms (judicial review), whether confirming the constitutionality of legislation, or simply and informally not deciding on a large number of cases. The original data collected from the Supreme Court decisions in judging direct actions of unconstitutionality point in the self-restraint direction: their abstention excludes constitutional checks, modifies the regional federative relationships and gives a degree of freedom to the legislature in the absence of judicial review of their activities. In this sense, a random sample of ADIs was collected from the Supreme Court’s website and submitted to statistical analysis by logistic regression in order to explain the restraint judicial behavior.

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