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Articles

Vol. 1 No. 1 (2014): Brazilian Journal of Empirical Legal Studies

New Horizons for Empirical Research in Law: “decentering” the subject, “interviewing” systems and “desubstantializing’’ legal categories

DOI
https://doi.org/10.19092/reed.v1i1.13
Submitted
January 25, 2014
Published
2014-01-25

Abstract

In this article, we argue that when interaction between law and social sciences is viewed as a backdrop, three epistemological propositions stand out as opening new horizons for empirical research in law, namely: “decentering the subject”, “interviewing” systems by means of qualitative interviews oriented toward the observation of communication, and the “desubstantialization of legal categories’’. These epistemological premises are described as the requisite conditions for grounding an external perspective on the law. They are also considered to be favorable for the development of multi-disciplinary research in law as both law and social sciences can (under certain conditions) benefit from these three analytical strategies. Social sciences must “take the law seriously”, research in law having to be carried out “with the law”. As for law, it may improve its observations and internal normative models by more fully integrating the knowledge generated by social sciences into its decisional premises. The author advances the hypothesis that this integration ‒ already a reality on the judicial arena, yet still lightly problematized ‒ will tend to continuously evolve ever more in the legal universe yet to come. Contemporary social issues (religious rights, minority rights, women’s rights, native peoples’ rights, the right to assisted suicide, same-sex marriage rights, reproductive rights, the rights of undocumented persons, etc.) are increasingly regulated by legal figures characterized by their “open normative composition” (fundamental values, human rights, etc.). Social sciences will increasingly tend to be seen as valuable cognitive resources for determining and specifying legality, thereby essential for those who conceive and shape the law. Indeed, since these issues demand creativity, juristic imagination and cognitive and normative openness from juridical actors when confronted with varying regulatory options, social sciences will in this context provide vital elements for determining potential, yet still not actualized, possibilities within this context.

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